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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/03/2004 Accident number: 401 
Accident time: 14:45 Accident Date: 04/05/2001 
Where it occurred: Nr Cafa Prushit border 
crossing 
Country: Kosovo 
Primary cause: Inadequate training (?) Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident 
(survey) 
Date of main report: 05/06/2001 
ID original source: BoI: 003/2001: TKG Name of source: KMACC 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMA-3 AP blast Ground condition: bushes/scrub 
leaf litter 
woodland 
Date record created: 05/03/2004 Date  last modified: 05/03/2004 
No of victims: 2 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: GR: 34T DM 5014 
8297 
Coordinates fixed by: GPS 
Map east: 5014 Map north: 8297 
Map scale: Junik Map series: M709 
Map edition: 3-DMA Map sheet: 3079-1 
Map name: 1:50,000  
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate equipment (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
metal-detector not used (?) 
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Accident report 
What follows is the original Board of Inquiry report, edited for anonymity and with excess 
pictures removed. 
 
REPORT FOR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD OF INQUIRY – No 003/2001 
Mine Accident that occurred in MNB West on Friday 4 May 2001 in which [Demining group] 
Operations Manager Mr [Demining group Ops manager] and Local Lad [Albanian adolescent] 
from Letaj Village (Albania) were both injured. 
 
Introduction 
1. In accordance with the Mine Action Co-ordination Center (MACC) Standard Working 
Procedure No 4, the MACC Programme Manager issued a Convening Order on Friday 4 
May 2001 for an Accident Investigation Board of Inquiry.  Annex A details the Convening 
Order. 
2. This is a comprehensive report by the Board of Inquiry into the mine accident that 
occurred on Friday 4 May 2001.  Based on the investigation, interviews, statements from 
[Demining group] personnel involved in the accident (see Annex B), visits and photos of 
the accident site, this accident is considered to be preventable. 
3. This finding is based on the fact that the accident was due to [Demining group Ops 
manager] following a local guide into a suspect area.  The guide was the first to step on a 
mine followed closely by [Demining group Ops manager] as he took a step to assist.  
Both mines were PMA 3 anti-personal (AP) blast mines.  According to the Vojska 
Jugoslavije (VJ) records these minefields should only have contained PMR 2A 
fragmentation mines, and made no mention at all of blast mines.  At the time of the 
accident [Demining group Ops manager] had all available information from IMSMA in the 
form of the VJ minefield records. 
4. The accident occurred at GR 34T DM 5014 8297 which is approximately 1.5km to the 
south east of the Cafa Prushit border crossing point between Albania and Kosovo at 1455 
hours on Friday 4 May 2001.  According to the maps the accident site is 50m inside the 
Albanian side of the border, although according to the VJ minefield records this area is 
inside Kosovo. 
 
Events leading up to the Accident 
5. [Demining group] has three seven-man clearance teams conducting operations in the 
vicinity of Cafa Prushit.  These are B1, B2, and B4.  The accident occurred approximately 
300 meters to the south of team B2 clearance site.   On the day of the accident Mr 
[Demining group Ops manager] the Operations Manager for [Demining group] was 
endeavoring to confirm the location of VJ minefields in this vicinity.  He was last seen 
approximately 20 minutes before the accident by the Team Leader (TL) of B2 Mr [name 
excised] at his site. 
6. After leaving B2 site, [Demining group Ops manager] proceeded down the track toward 
the main Control Point (CP).  When he got to the intersection that leads down to the CP 
he met up with the local lad [Albanian adolescent].  [This person] is 16 years old and he 
lives in the village of Letaj, which is on the Albania side of the border very close to the 
accident site. 
7. [The Albanian adolescent] was sitting at the track intersection when [Demining group Ops 
manager] met up with him.  [The Albanian adolescent] offered to take [Demining group 
Ops manager] and show him the location of a mined area that he knew of.  Whilst 
following the lad, [Demining group Ops manager] has stated that he had doubts of the 
area they were walking through.  He told [the Albanian adolescent] to stop, however [the 
Albanian adolescent] was so confident with where he was going that [Demining group 
Ops manager] relented and they continued.  They came to a point where [the Albanian 
2 
adolescent] was searching the ground, and it was then that [Demining group Ops 
manager] realised they were in a minefield.  He told [the Albanian adolescent] to stop and 
that they would go back.  Almost immediately after this [the Albanian adolescent] stood 
on a mine.  [Demining group Ops manager] took a step forward to assist him, and it was 
then that he also stood on a mine.  It was only a matter of seconds between each 
explosion.  [The Albanian adolescent] got up and was hopping around on one leg.  They 
had both received injuries to their left feet.  [Demining group Ops manager] told [the 
Albanian adolescent] to not move about, as there was the obvious possibility that he may 
set off another mine. 
8. [Demining group Ops manager] called the TL of B2 on his radio and informed him of the 
mine strikes.  He then guided the lad out of the immediate area and awaited the arrival of 
B2.  B2 had just completed operations for the day and were making their way down the 
track toward the junction.  The area is heavily vegetated with bushes and trees and 
therefore they were unable to see the accident site from their location.  The TL of B2 
immediately called by radio to the TL of B1, which was the nearest team to their site, 
approximately 1km away and informed him of the accident. He requested that B1 make 
their way to his site, and he then called the [Demining group] base and informed them of 
the accident. The family of [the Albanian adolescent] whose village of Letaj is very near 
the site also heard the two explosions and they made their way to the accident site.  As it 
turned out the local villagers and the team of B2 arrived at the accident site at the same 
time. The team of B2 cleared an expedient safe lane up to the two casualties and 
extracted them both to a safe area. The villagers wanted to take [the Albanian 
adolescent] immediately to hospital, but the medic of B2 prevented them from doing this 
until he had treated him. The family were very impatient to take [the Albanian adolescent] 
and therefore the medic was only able to apply bandages to him before the family carried 
him down the hill toward the main CP. The medic then began treatment to [Demining 
group Ops manager] by applying dressings to the wound, administering an IV and giving 
pain relief. Once he had given the initial first aid, they then carried [Demining group Ops 
manager] by stretcher down the hill to Helicopter Landing Site (HLS) Red – 7 
(approximately 700 meters away) which is located next to their main CP. 
9. As the team of B2 were carrying [Demining group Ops manager] down the hill the team of 
B1 arrived coming up the track.  They then took it in turns to carry [Demining group Ops 
manager].  It took approximately 25 minutes to get [Demining group Ops manager] down 
the hill to the HLS.  Mr [name excised] the Handicap International (HI) medical co-
ordinator who had been sent to the HLS by his programme manager was waiting there for 
them when they arrived.  Further treatment was given to [Demining group Ops manager] 
whilst waiting for the helicopter, which arrived 20 minutes later at 1549 hours.  
10.  The villagers had made their way down the hill to the main CP, but because they had 
taken another track the team of B1 did not see them, and as it turns out they had passed 
each other on the hill. When the villagers arrived at the main CP they spoke to the 
[Demining group] ambulance driver who is a local employee of [the Demining group] and 
got him to take them to the civilian hospital in Gjakova (approximately 17km away). 
11. [Demining group Ops manager] was evacuated by helicopter to the Italian KFOR Hospital 
in Peja and was accompanied by the TL of B1 and the medic of B2. He was operated on 
and had his left foot amputated by the Italian doctors.  As [the Albanian adolescent] was 
taken to Gjakova civilian hospital by his family he was operated on there.  He has had 
four toes of his left foot amputated. 
12.  A safe lane was cleared to the seat of the two uncontrolled explosions and a 25m² box 
was cleared around the explosions in order that photographs could be taken and further 
investigation of the site made.  An armed PMA 3 was located 2m before the seat of the 
two explosions. This mine was surface laid, however was covered over with grass and 
leaves at the time it was discovered. Therefore both [the Albanian adolescent] and 
[Demining group Ops manager] walked past this mine before they stood on their mines. 
They would have then had to come back past this same mine again when they extracted 
themselves from the area. There was no further evidence of mines found. 
13.  
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VIEW OF THE INCIDENT SITE, LOOKING NORTH FROM THE SAFE AREA 
 
[The third PMA-3 as it was found (above ground).] 
 
Work History of the Casualty 
14.  Mr. [Demining group Ops manager] has been working for [Demining group] as the 
Operations Manager in Kosovo since July 1999.  Before this he has been with [Demining 
group] in Mozambique and Somaliland since February 1994 in varying appointments from 
deminer up to his present appointment as Operations Manager.  He has been a demining 
team leader, demining instructor and a Level Two Survey Team Leader. [Demining group 
Ops manager] has a wealth of experience and knowledge, and is very well respected 
within the Kosovo demining community. 
 
Past History of the Area 
15. The accident site is approximately 100m to the west of minefield number 396 that is part 
of task dossier number W02–63.  This task dossier contains five minefields all in close 
proximity to each other. This area is on the Kosovo-Albanian border and was 
subsequently heavily mined by the VJ Army to deny access from Albania.  
 
Sequence, Documentation and Procedure of Tasking 
16. The task dossier No W02-63 was issued to [Demining group] on 19 April 2001.  Teams 
B2 and B1 commenced clearance at their respective sites on 1 May 2001.  There have 
been no reports of any previous accidents in this area. 
 
Geography and Weather 
17. The area in general is the Kosovo – Albanian Border approximately 1.5 km from the Cafa 
Prushit border crossing post. There is a hill range that divides the two countries, with the 
border generally running along the middle of the main ridgeline. The hill range is heavily 
vegetated with bushes and trees, and is interspersed with patches of clear grassy areas. 
There are a number of tracks that are well traveled and others that are overgrown and not 
used in this vicinity. The accident site is located 100m to the west of minefield number 
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396 of Task Dossier W02-63.  The area of the accident is on the southern side of a hill 
and in among bushes and trees.  It is a distance of approximately 700m from the accident 
site down the hill along the access track to HLS Red-07, that is located next to the 
[Demining group] main CP. Access to the main CP is via a gravel road from the direction 
of Gjakova that is 17km to the north. The weather at the time of the accident was fine with 
a temperature of approximately 20 degrees celsius. 
 
Site Layout and Marking 
18. As this accident occurred outside an operational minefield there were no minefield 
markings at the time of the accident.  The minefield marking in the photographs are those 
from the access lane and the 25m² box that was cleared in order to conduct the 
investigation. 
 
Management Supervision and Discipline 
19. [Demining group Ops manager] as the [Demining group] Operations Manager is 
responsible for the management of [Demining group] clearance operations.  He is in 
effect the second in command for [Demining group] Kosovo. 
 
Quality Assurance and Quality Control 
20. [Demining group] Quality Control is achieved through a system of on-site checks by the 
Team Leaders to ensure adherence to the mineclearance SOP’s. The MACC QA teams 
conduct external Quality Assurance on a regular basis, normally each site is visited a 
minimum of once per week. 
 
Communications and Reporting 
21. At the time of the accident there was effective communication by VHF hand-held Motorola 
radios between [Demining group Ops manager] and the TL of B2 on their internal net.  
There was further communication by hand-held VHF radios from B2 to the other 
[Demining group] clearance teams in the vicinity, and [Demining group] HQ situated in 
Gjakova. The Italian KFOR callsign ‘kilo foxtrot’ in MNB (W) were contacted on the MNB 
(W) channel 4 by callsign 51 (NPA). This was after callsign 56A ([Demining group] 
Programme Manager) had endeavored to contact kilo foxtrot but could not do so, so 
requested that 51 try to contact them to report the accident. The Italian radio operator 
was not proficient with English and there was initial confusion between him and the radio 
operator for NPA.  There was a delay in getting the helicopter airborne and to the HLS 
site as the Italian KFOR were reluctant to send it without confirmation of the injuries to the 
casualty. KFOR were continually asking [Demining group] for confirmation of the injuries, 
but they were unable to give this. It was not until the MACC Liaison Officer for MNB (W) 
spoke by radio to one of the Italian KFOR Operations Officers in French that the 
helicopter was finally dispatched. He stated to kilo foxtrot that as a helo casevac has 
been requested, then they should dispatch it immediately. This was now almost 40 
minutes after the accident occurred.   The confirmation of the injuries from [Demining 
group] to kilo foxtrot was not passed until the helicopter had landed at the HLS, 55 
minutes after the accident occurred.  Fortunately the injuries [Demining group Ops 
manager] received were not life threatening, however the consequences may have been 
fatal had the injuries been of a more serious nature. 
22. Communications between [Demining group] base location in Gjakova and MNB (W) 
KFOR callsign kilo foxtrot is maintained via the VHF system on Channel 4, which is the 
MNB (W) channel. 
 
Medical Details 
23. [Demining group Ops manager] has had his left foot amputated and [Albanian adolescent] 
has lost four toes of his left foot. 
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24. Annex G details the medical report from the MACC QA Medical Officer and the 
Appendices to the Annex detail the two hospital reports from Italian KFOR Hospital and 
the Gjakova Hospital. 
 
Personnel 
24. A list of personnel and their duties is detailed at Annex B. Written statements from 
[Demining group] personnel involved in the accident form the Appendices to this Annex. 
 
Dress and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 
25. At the time of the accident [Demining group Ops manager] was not wearing protective 
equipment.  This however had no bearing on the injury he received. 
 
Tools and Equipment  
26. [Demining group Ops manager] was not using any tools at the time of the accident.  
 
Details of Mine Involved 
27. [Large picture removed.] 
 
Account of Activities 
28. The following is a description of the events before and after the accident. The information 
from the investigation forms the basis of the description of events: 
 
4 May 2001 
1435hrs (approx) – [Demining group Ops manager] departs B2 team site and meets up 
with local lad [the Albanian adolescent] at the track intersection.  [The Albanian 
adolescent] offers to show [Demining group Ops manager] the location of mines. 
1455hrs – [The Albanian adolescent] and [Demining group Ops manager] stand on 
mines. 
1455hrs – The TL of B2 ([name excised]) calls [Demining group Ops manager] on the 
radio and confirms that they have both stood on mines and have been injured.  TL of 
B2 calls B1 and callsign 56 ([Demining group] base) and informs them of the situation 
then takes his team to the accident site to effect the casevac. 
1458hrs – B2 arrive at the accident site and commence the extraction of casualties to the 
safe area.  The team leader of B2 calls 56 and gives details of injured.  The team 
medic of B2 [name excised] then administers first aid to [the Albanian adolescent] 
and then his family carries him down the hill to the main CP. 
1500 – 1505hrs - The medic administers first aid to [Demining group Ops manager] in the 
safe area. 
1505 – 1530hrs – [Demining group Ops manager] is stretchered down the hill to HLS Red 
– 07 by B2 team members and assisted by B1 when they meet on the track. 
1506 - 1507hrs - 56A calls 63 (MACC Operations) on channel 1 and reports the accident 
and the grid reference to HLS Red – 07.  63 informs 56A to contact the Italian KFOR 
in MNB (W) callsign kilo foxtrot directly on the MNB (W) channel 4. 
1508hrs – 56A attempts to contact kilo foxtrot on channel 4 without success.  56A then 
reports the accident to callsign 51 (NPA) and requests a helo casevac from HLS Red 
– 07.  51 clarifies with 56A the number of casualties and extent of injuries.  56A can 
only give the number of casualties as one, but can not confirm injuries. 
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1509 - 1513hrs – Kilo foxtrot calls 51 and asks for details of the accident and a grid 
reference.  51 informs kilo foxtrot of the grid at HLS Red – 07.  The radio operator for 
kilo foxtrot has difficulty understanding because of his poor English. This has to be 
repeated to him. Kilo foxtrot then asks 51 for the number of casualties, which is then 
given to him, but once again he has difficulty understanding because of his poor 
English and this also has to be repeated to him. Kilo foxtrot then asks 51 for details of 
injuries. 51 directs kilo foxtrot to call 56A to get this information as they do not know  
Kilo foxtrot then calls 56A and asks for details of injuries. 56A informs kilo foxtrot that 
he does not have this information as the casualty is still being evacuated. He does 
however give the casualty’s name and that they think it is a lower leg amputation. Kilo 
foxtrot then asks 56A if he wants a medevac by helo, to which 56A responds in the 
affirmative. Kilo foxtrot then confirms with 56A that the HLS is Red – 07. 
1513 - 1514hrs – Kilo foxtrot calls 56A and asks if the casualty is dead or alive, to which 
56A responds that he is unable to confirm either way at this time. 
1515hrs – Kilo foxtrot once again asks 56A to confirm the detail of injuries, to which 56A 
responds that he will inform them as soon as he can confirm. 
1520 - 1522hrs – Kilo foxtrot informs 56A that they are still waiting for confirmed details of 
injuries and they will need this before they will dispatch the helo. 56A replies that he 
understands the situation, however the casualty is still being evacuated to the HLS 
and he dos not have the details.  Kilo foxtrot then asks for the casualty’s name. 56A 
gives the name as well as the blood group type. 
1523hrs – 53A (HI Programme Manager) informs 56A that 53X (HI medical co-ordinator) 
is on his way to HLS Red – 07 to give assistance. 
1525hrs – 51 asks kilo foxtrot if the helo is on its way to HLS Red – 07. Kilo foxtrot 
responds that they can send a helo to HLS Red – 07 but they still need confirmation 
of the injuries. 
1226 - 1529hrs – 51 ask kilo foxtrot to confirm that they are waiting for the details of the 
injuries.  Kilo foxtrot confirms this. Kilo foxtrot calls 63L (MACC Liaison Officer for 
MNB (W)) and they converse in French. 
1529hrs – 63L calls 56 and informs that the helo will depart for HLS Red – 07 in 5 
minutes. 
1532hrs – Kilo foxtrot asks 56A for detail concerning injuries. 56A replies that he cannot 
confirm the detail, only that they believe it is a lower leg amputation. Kilo foxtrot 
requests that 56A notify them as soon as the information can be confirmed. 
1549 - 1551hrs – 56A informs kilo foxtrot that the helo is at HLS Red – 07 and is uplifting 
the casualty and he has confirmation of the injuries, which he passes to kilo foxtrot. 
1554hrs – 56A confirms with 51that the casualty will be taken to the Italian Hospital in 
Peja. 
1600hrs – [The Albanian adolescent] arrives at Gjakova Hospital. 
1700hrs – [Demining group Ops manager] operated on at Italian KFOR Hospital, Peja. 
1800hrs – [The Albanian adolescent] operated on at Gjakova Hospital. 
 
Insurance Details 
29. [Demining group Ops manager] is covered by the [Demining group] personal insurance it 
has for all staff.  All insurance policies for [Demining group] are through HMT Insurance 
Brokers Ltd of London.  A copy of the insurance detail is kept in the MACC QA Office. 
 
Conclusions 
30. Based on the investigation, interviews, the statements and visits to the site, the Board of 
Inquiry concludes the following: 
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• [Demining group Ops manager] was following a guide into an area that was not along a 
well used path.  He had doubts about the area he was in, however the guide seemed 
confident of where he was going, therefore [Demining group Ops manager] continued to 
follow him. 
• The information according to the VJ records is that there are no blast mines in the 
minefields in this area. 
• The accident occurred 50m inside the Albanian side of the border. 
• [Demining group Ops manager] guided the lad out of the immediate area.  In the process, 
they moved past the other PMA 3 mine that they previously walked past immediately 
before their accident. They were very fortunate not to have also stood on this mine as 
well. 
• Medical aid was on site within 5 minutes of the accident occurring. The TL of B2 reported 
the accident to 56 at the accident site. 
• There was an unnecessary delay getting a helicopter casevac to the HLS.  KFOR were 
unwilling to dispatch it without confirmation of the injuries.  It took 40 minutes from the 
time KFOR were first requested for the helicopter casevac, to when it actually arrived at 
the HLS. There may have been severe or fatal consequences had the injuries been life 
threatening. 
• The [Demining group] radio log is incomplete and does not record who made, or when the 
first call came in of the accident. There are other known radio transmissions that have not 
been recorded in this log during the period of the casualty evacuation. According to the 
TL of B2 he reported the accident at the accident site.  There were no problems with 
communications between 56 and B2 during the casevac to the HLS. Therefore 56 should 
have confirmed the injuries with B2 and then notified KFOR before it did. 
• Oxygen was not administered to [Demining group Ops manager] until he had arrived at 
the HLS. This was because oxygen was not available at the team site, but in the 
ambulance at the main CP, 700m away. All other first aid medical treatment provided to 
[Demining group Ops manager] prior to his helicopter casevac was good. 
 
Recommendations 
31. The following are recommendations based on the Board of Inquiry conclusions: 
• Re-emphasise to all clearance organisations to not follow local guides into areas that are 
considered to be suspect, especially if indications are that the area is not well used by 
local people. 
• Re-emphasise to all clearance organisations that mine casualties should remain where 
they are after the accident if they know help is arriving, and wait to be extracted from the 
danger area.  This is to avoid further injury from any other mines that could be in the 
vicinity. 
• The [Demining group] Net Control Station must maintain a complete and accurate radio 
log of all radio transmissions. 
• If KFOR receive a request for a helicopter casevac then it should be sent without delay. 
• Further specific medical recommendations are detailed at Annex G [see Emdical report 
for Victim No.1]. 
 
Signed: UNMIK Mine Action Co-ordination Center, Quality Assurance Officer 
 
Annexes: 
A. MACC convening order for accident investigation Board of Inquiry. 
B. List of personnel involved with attached statements as Appendices. 
C. IMSMA Mine Accident Report. 
D.  Map of the general area. 
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E Schematic diagram of the general accident area.  
F The [Demining group] radio log. 
G.   Medical report from the MACC QA Officer, with KFOR Hospital report and Gjakova 
Hospital Report. 
 
Comments by the MACC Chief Operations Officer 
This accident occurred across the border in Albania. The boy who led [Demining group Ops 
manager] into the minefield is from a village situated in Albania. Whilst much is known of the 
mined area locations within Kosovo, little is known about the situation in Albania. Many of the 
mined areas in Albania are generally located very close or adjacent to the actual border.  
All mine/UXO clearance organisations are to ensure that their efforts are confined to those 
mined areas located within Kosovo and that are contained within the Task Dossier. 
[Demining group Ops manager] allowed a local boy, from Albania, to lead him across the 
border, into an unknown area and into a minefield with tragic consequences.  This is an old 
lesson relearned. 
There was a 41 minute delay (15.08 – 15.49 hrs) from the time that a helicopter was first 
requested to the actual time of its arrival at HLS Red-7. This time may have been 
considerably shortened if 56A had been able to answer basic questions from Kilo-Foxtrot 
(KF). This information should have been readily available via callsign B2 and communicated 
to 56A on request. The language difficulties of two non-native English speakers, 51 (Albanian) 
and KF (Italian), attempting to pass information in English also compounded this situation. 
This is a reoccurring problem in MNB (W) and may easily be alleviated by the realisation that 
very few Italian soldiers speak good English but there are a great number of Kosovo 
Albanians that do speak good Italian and English. The hiring of such people as radio 
operators would go a long way to resolving this on going problem. 
The Recommendations and Conclusions of the Board of Inquiry are fully endorsed and 
concurred with. 
 
Signed: UNMIK Mine Action Co-ordination Center, Chief of Operations  
 
Comments by the MACC Programme Manager 
The conclusions and recommendations of this BOI are concurred with.  
This accident serves to highlight the risk associated with the conduct of reconnaissance tasks 
prior to clearance operations commencing. [Demining group Ops manager] is a very 
experienced supervisor, and has been injured because he trusted the local guide more than 
he trusted his instincts and training. The mine action community is filled with people who have 
done the same thing, but have been lucky enough to get away with it. 
The mines that were encountered in this incident are clearly inside Albanian territory, and 
therefore beyond the mandate of this clearance programme. MACC Operations Branch are to 
ensure that clearance organisations are instructed not to cross the border, and particularly not 
to conduct clearance operations in Albanian territory without the express approval of the 
MACC.  
Handicap International are to be commended for their role in assisting with medical support 
during this multi-casualty accident. Their intervention was timely and effective.  
Signed: UNMIK Mine Action Co-ordination Center, Programme Manager 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 516 Name: Name removed 
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Age: 38 Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 1 hour 5 minutes 
Protection issued: None Protection used: none 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
minor Leg 
AMPUTATION/LOSS 
Leg Below knee 
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
Two relevant medical reports for Victim no.1 were made available. Photographs of the 
surgical procedure were included, along with a photograph showing minor blast injury to the 
Victim’s other leg. 
 
Medical report concerning [names excised] accident 04/05/01 14.55 PM 
This report is based on interviews with the following staff members from [Demining group]:  
[Two demining groups medics and the Medical Co-ordinator of Handicap International.] 
 
Attachments:  
Casualty report [Demining group], medical report Italian Field Hospital, medical report 
Gjakova Hospital.  
 
Introduction: 
[The demining group] have three seven-man clearance teams conducting operations in the 
vicinity of Cafa Prusit. The accident occurred approximately 300 meters to the south of one 
team (B2) clearance site. On the day of the accident [Victim no.1] was endeavouring to 
confirm the location of Dangerous Areas in this vicinity. At the time of accident [Victim no.1] 
was following [Victim no.2] along a track. The track was considered to be safe when [Victim 
no.2] stepped on a mine. Due to the explosion [Victim no.1] took a step backwards and 
stepped on a second mine. At the time of accident there was one qualified medic, Mr. [name 
excised], with his medical equipment approximately 300 meters away from the place were the 
accident occurred. Additionally there was one more qualified medic, Mr. [name excised], 
posted at the control point 600 meters away from the accident site. When [Medic no.1]i heard 
the explosions he rushed towards the accident site. [Victim no.1] and [Victim no.2] received 
first aid treatment by [Medic no.1] as soon as they where moved out from the minefield to a 
safe area. After [Victim no.2] had received first aid treatment he was evacuated via the control 
point to Gjakova hospital by road. [Victim no.1] received first aid treatment at the safe area 
and was subsequently moved to the control point. [Victim no.1] received additional treatment 
from the Medical co-ordinator of Handicap International while awaiting the arrival of the 
CASEVAC helicopter. Finally the CASEVAC helicopter transported [Victim no.1] to the Italian 
Field Hospital in Peja.  
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Order of events: 
Time Event 
14.55 PM Accident occurred. 
14.58 PM [Victim no.2] receives first aid treatment. 
15.00 PM [Victim no.1] receives first aid treatment. 
15.00 PM [Victim no.2] evacuated from the safe area. 
15.05 PM [Victim no.1] evacuated from the safe area. 
15.09 PM Request for CASEVAC helicopter received by KFOR. 
15.20 PM [Victim no.2] evacuated from CCP by ambulance. 
15.30 PM [Victim no.1] arrives at CCP. 
15.34 PM CASEVAC helicopter takes of from Peja. 
15.49 PM CASEVAC helicopter landed at CP. 
15.55 PM CASEVAC helicopter airborne. 
16.00 PM [Victim no.2] arrives at Gjacova Hospital. 
16.10 PM [Victim no.1] arrives at Italian Field Hospital in Peja. 
 
The following assessments/actions were taken on the safe area by medic [No.1].. 
[Victim no.2]: pressure bandage to prevent bleeding. 
[Victim no.1]: pressure bandage to prevent bleeding. IV-line canula 18 gauge, infusion Ringer-
lactate 500 ml, Intramuscular Injection of 100 mg Pethedine was administrated. 
 
The following assessments/actions were taken at CP by the Medical Co-ordinator of 
Handicap International. 
[Victim no.1]: additional dressing, oxygen was administrated, additional IV line canula 22 
gauge established, Infusion Ringer-lactate 500 ml, puls/bloodpressure was measured, 
Oxygen saturation was monitored and a cervical collar was applied. 
[Victim No.1] who sustained the following injuries:  
Traumatic amputation of left foot, small superficial abrasions of the frontal surface of the right 
tibia. 
The below mentioned assessments/actions/therapies was carried out at the scene of 
accident/safe area . 
Primary survey:  
Glasgow Coma Scale 4-6-5 =15 
Airways: Intact and open. 
Breathing Respiratory pattern and rate within normal rate. 
Circulation: Blood pressure /pulse within normal rate/limits. The bleeding was assessed as 
not extensive and controlled by application of compressive dressings, elevation of stump and 
finally an Esmarh roller was applied. 
Disability: A cervical collar “Stiffneck” applied after manual stabilization of head/neck. 
 
Second Survey: 
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IV line*2 (Both arms) 18 gauge. 
500 ml Ringer solution*2 Infusion. 
Oxygen therapy via face mask with reservoir 15 l/min. 
100 mg of Pethedine IM was administrated 
 
[Victim No.1] has been admitted into the Italian Field Hospital Peja since the day of accident 
and he will be discharged from hospital 30 of May 2001.  The healing process has proceeded 
without any major complications and there are in my opinion no contraindications for [Victim 
No.1] to return back to Zimbabwe for further treatment. 
 
Conclusions 
CASEVAC was performed according to S.O.P 
Oxygen was not administrated to [Victim no.1] at the safe area. 
Respond time for CASEVAC Helicopter 25 minutes due to KFOR requested more information 
concerning the causalities. 
”On scene” time exceeded one hour. 
 
Recommendations 
Always administrate oxygen as soon as possible to all trauma patients to prevent anaerobic 
metabolism. When working in areas more than 5 minutes away from CP a portable Oxygen-
kit should be brought to the site. 
If possible use IV canula with minimum size of 16 gauge to all trauma patients. 
All organisations are to provide KFOR with all necessary information as soon as possible in 
order to avoid unnecessary delays when requesting for helicopter CASEVAC. 
 
Signed: QA Medical Officer, UNMIK MACC 
 
The following is a Surgical/medical report for Victim no.1 that was made available. It has been 
edited for anonymity but the peculiarities in English have been left in place. 
 
To:  QA MEDIC, UN MACC Pristina 
From:  Regional Liaison Officer MNB West, Pec 
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Date: 4 June 2001  
Reference:  RLO/MNBW01M35 
Subject::  TRANSLATION OF MEDICAL REPORT 
Relaxation for the patient [name excised] 39 masculine years.   [The Victim’s age was given 
as 38 on the IMSMA report.] 
Hospitalised in emergency at the  Italian military hospital on the May 4, 01. The injury was 
caused by an accident with a mine. The same day he underwent the amputation of his left 
foot at a distance of " III disc ale ".   
During his hospitalisation his injury was controlled frequently.   
May 18 the patient has undertaken a HIV and HCV test. The two tests were positive.   
The 19 of May the doctor removed points of suture.   
Good present general condition.   
It is recommended to treat the wound two times per week. 
Therapy: Zinnat 500 mg cps 1x2 die, Imeprazen 1cps die, Polivitaminica 1 cps die, 
Bassado 1 cps die, Toradol au besoin 
He left the hospital the 28th of May with the following diagnosis: lesion due to an 
explosion on the left bottom part of the foot.   
In appendix six floppies disks with the images before during and after the surgical 
intervention.   
   
  DESCRIPTION OF THE SURGICAL INTERVENTION   
Under local anaesthesia the wound was cleaned. He lost a lot of substance from the front of 
the left foot. Brief visualisation of the tibia. I don't note a haemorrhage at the level of the 
venous windpipe. Due to the serious of the injury and the level of contamination, the decision 
was taken, after having informed the patient, to amputate the left foot. 
One exercised a double previous and posterior incision of skin at the level of the foot. Lasting 
l incision, one could see the muscular groups that were in the process to be isolated. The cut 
was done before having tightened the veins and the artery. Then we isolated muscular groups 
as well as the nervous structures. Before the ligature one did an infiltration of carbocaine 2% 
(without pure alcohol). Then, l one has done the ostéotomie of the tibia at 3rd lower of the 
fibula (about 1 cm in addition) in two times to join the cover of bones and correctly covering 
the bones. Frequent cleaning with a solution of antibiotic Na Cl 0.9%. Control of the 
hemostase. With point of suture one fixed groups  muscular on top of it in order to cover the 
bones. Positioning of a duplicate drainage of type «pen - pink» having the shape of an “U”. 
Suture with a thread of silk. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 517 Name: Name removed 
Age: 16 Gender: Male 
Status: civilian  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 1 hour 
Protection issued: None Protection used: none 
 
Summary of injuries: 
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INJURIES 
minor Hand 
AMPUTATION/LOSS 
Toes  
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
A medical report was made available and is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
Photographs of the Victim’s injury before and after surgery were also made available. 
 
 
THE SPECIALIST'S REPORT 
The patient was brought to Emergency Room  in civilian Hospital at Gjakova on 04 05 0l at 
1600 hrs. After the assistance they gave to him, he was admitted to the Orthopaedic 
department. They ca!1 me to visit the patient, after that I decide that he must undergo 
operation. We started at 1800hrs under the spinal anaesthesia and we finished the operation 
around 2100 hrs. The status during and after operation was OK. In mean time he received 
antibiotics of broad spectrum analgesics, IV fluids, the vaccination and all necessary 
treatment he needed. For the moment there is a defect on tbe skin which during the first 
operation it was impossible to fix, but we are planning another operation on him after a few 
days. 
In my opinion the patient must be at the hospital at least for two weeks more. 
 
Signed: Head of Orthopaedic Dept., 07/05/2001 
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Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Inadequate training”  because Victim No.1 
appears to have forgotten his training and entered a mined area foolishly. The fact that the 
mined area was not within their jurisdiction (in another country) compounds this error. To 
follow a local boy and accept their “confidence” is inexplicable. The secondary cause is listed 
as a “Management/control inadequacy” because Victim No.1 was a senior manager and set a 
very bad example to those beneath him.  
He did ensure that he had radio contact, but it may have been fortuitous that deminers were 
still on site to extract him, and that medics were quickly available (they were packing up to 
leave when the accident occurred). 
 
Statements 
The following statements were made available. 
 
STATEMENT BY – DEMINERS and Team Leader [conflated] - MINE INCIDENT 04/05(01 
It was on 04l05/01 at l4:57hrs when we received a mine accident report from Bravo Two (2)  
They requested for a Medic with all his kit and the ambulance. a stretcher bed and more 
personnel to carry casualties as they were reported to be two (2).  
We arrived at the [B2’s] control point at about 15:l0hrs and met the Guide who took us up the 
hill. On our way after traveling for at least 600 m we met B2 carrying the casualty down to the 
control point. We then took over carrying the stretcher down to the control point 
At the control point the Team Leader then sent the mine accident report to the [demining 
group] HO and within a few minutes, at 15:50hrs. the Helicopter arrived whilst our medics 
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were doing final touches to the casualty. The Team leader and the medic accompanied the 
casualty to Peja KFOR Base, and handed over the casualty to the doctors who took him to 
the theater. 
Signed Team Leaders and deminers. 
 
STATEMENT BY MEDIC B2 -  MINE INCIDENT  
Our Call-Sign (Bravo 2) was withdrawing from our worksite when we heard two bangs from 
the South, about 300 m away from us. It was about 1455 hrs. Our reaction was to move 
around using the safe path towards the direction of the bangs. We heard two people 
screaming. We called Mr [Victim no.1]’s name and he answered that he had stepped on a 
mine. The Team Leader established a ‘Safe Area’ and sent in one deminer to clear toward the 
casualties. I attended to the local casualty at about 1458 hrs. He was the first to be removed 
from the minefield, After finishing with him I ordered the locals to go with him down to the 
main Control Point where they will meet up with the medic of Bravo 1. 
I started to attend to [Victim No.1]at 1500 hrs. I stopped the bleeding using two field bandages 
and one pressure bandage A drip was put in and 500 ml of Ringer Lactate connected. Then I 
gave him a portent anaIgesia: Pethadine, 100mg - Intramuscular. 
At 1505 hrs I had finished stabilizing him. We started going down the hill and it took us 25 
minutes to get to the main control point. 
By the time we got to the control point the local casualty had been casevaced, using our 
ambulance. to the local hospital 
The Italian KEOR Helicopter arrived at about 1550 hrs and accompanied the casualty to the 
Italian Field Hospital in Peja. 
 
STATEMENT BY  DEMINER B2 MINE INCIDENT 04105/01 
As we were about to knock off our days work, Sunray 56 B left our mine field for a recce of 
another task. He instructed our Team-Leader to give him a call on our way dawn the 
Mountain. 
On our way down before my team-leader gave a call we heard two Bangs. The team-leader 
then tried to raise 568 a call but in vain when tried again the Third/Fourth that’s when 56B 
shouted for help informing us that we had stepped on a mine. 
We ware given order by our team-leader ard I was told to go down the mountain and wait or 
the other call-sign which was coming to give us a hand. When I got down I instructed our 
playtime [driver] to move our ambulance near our way to the mountain. The teamn-leader of 
BI then arrived with his star-light (medic) plus one deminer. I then led them up the mountain 
and we met our work-mates with the casualty. We made our way back and when we got to 
our main control point we were told that one local-guy was taken to Hospital. 
Our star-light was helped by the star-tight of Bravo 1 and some other Handicap medics. The 
Helicopter came and the casualty was taken to the Hospital This is all I can Say about the 
accident. 
 
 
STATEMENT BY THE CASUALTY – [Victim No.1] 
[Demining group] OPERATIONS MANAGER 
I had just departed from C/S 56 B2’s location and was making my way down to the men 
Control Point (CP). At the junction of the Border Patrol Route and a track leading down to the 
main CP I met a young boy. The Team Leader had mentioned that a young boy had visited 
the team and had been talking about mines in the area and that the boy had been sent to the 
main CP. We greeted each other and asked in very simple Albanian whether there were 
“mines or no mines”. He answered with an affirmative “Yes! Mines. Come I will show you”. We 
16 
followed a path going up from the junction to the top of the slope into an open area and then 
onwards onto another path. He made to turn right up into the trees but I said “No! Lets stop 
here”. He answered that “No the mines are on top”. He seemed so confident about his actions 
that I relented and followed. We walked up the hill for no more than 100m when the boy 
stopped and started to look at the ground as if searching for something. It was at this point 
that I realised that we were in a minefield so I said to him “Let's go back”. Almost immediately 
the boy stepped on a mine and without thinking I tried to assist and stepped on another. The 
boy got up off the ground and started to cry out and hop around. I tried to calm him indicating 
that there may be more mines. I called C/S 56 B2's Medic [name excised] on the radio and 
informed him that we had been injured and asked him to meet us. I guided the boy away from 
the accident site and awaited the team. At about the same time that the team reached us, 
some local villagers, who I later found out included the boy's family had made their way to the 
area. Once we had been evacuated to a safe area, [the medic] attended to our wounds, 
seeing to the boy first and then sending him down to the main C/P to be attended to by the 
Medic from C/S 56 B1 who was on the way. After I had been treated we made our way down 
to the HLS. 
lam sure that the mine was a PMA-3 as I recognised a part That had been left behind after 
the explosion. The boy had also previously described what I thought to be a PMA-3. 
Signed: Demining group Operations Manager 
 
 
STATEMENT BY - TEAM LEADER 82 MINE INCIDENT 
CIS Bravo 2 was withdrawing from the worksite and after abort 300rn from our advanced 
control point I heard two Bangs. At 14-55hrs I called for 56B [The victim] on the small means 
[hand held VHF, radios] since he had also asked me to raise him when we were going back to 
our main control point. The first time I called him, he did not answer but later on answered 
and informed me that he had been injured. I told the whole team to leave all that they were 
carrying and help the medic carry the medic-peck and the stretcher. I detailed one deminer to 
clear the area we were using as a path to where the injured were lying. Some locals from the 
nearby village had already run into the minefield trying to rescue the injured. The first guy to 
be brought out of the minefield was the local guy 56B was moving with. He was taken to a 
safe area and bandaged and later to the main control point where an ambulance was waiting. 
We took 56B out as well and the medic attended to him. Meanwhile I had informed all the 
other C/S about the accident and asked Bravo One to bring his ambulance, medic and some 
personnel to help us. Bravo Ore was at our control point in ten minutes and soon afterward 
they were coming towards us. We took 56B down on the stretcher and meanwhile the medic 
took details of the casualty whiIst we took him down to the main control point. We met Bravo 
One half way dawn the hill and they helped us carry the stretcher. When we arrived at the 
main control point the Italian army was there and an ambulance from Handicap International. 
The medics there also attended to the casualty but the injured local guy had already been 
taken to the Hospital. Bravo One Sunray then sent the mine accident report to 56. Within a 
short period of time the Helicopter arrived and 56B was taken to the Hospital. I was informed 
56A was on his way to us and I waited for him until he arrived and briefed him on what had 
happened. We then left for HQ. 
This is all I know about the accident. 
 
Signed: Team Leader  
 
17 
